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Chapter 12: 
Identity, Rationality, and Emotion in the  
Processes of State Disintegration and Reconstruction 
 
Roger Petersen 
 
 
I wish to address both a substantive and a methodological issue in this chapter.  
Substantively, I will discuss the process of state disintegration and reconstruction.  Here, 
I will draw on the experience of Eastern Europe following the collapse of Communism.  
Today, more than twenty new states occupy the territories formerly held by the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.  Furthermore, the process of breakdown and 
rebuilding is incomplete, especially in terms of identity issues.  For example, while most 
people have some understanding of how the first Yugoslavia collapsed, few appreciate 
how the second “rump” Yugoslavia and the surrounding territories remain in flux.  
Albanians and Slavs are working toward new political and social equilibria in 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and the three mixed municipalities in Serbia proper 
(Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedje).  In Montenegro, the Slavic population is divided 
over whether they are Montenegrins, Serbs, or simultaneously Montenegrins and Serbs.  
In the Sandzak, people are debating whether they are Bosnjaks or just Muslims.  In 
Moldova, a Dniestrian Republic rules a sliver of land on the left bank of Dniester River 
while the Gagauz have been given ethno-territorial autonomy within the entity on the 
right bank.  In the Baltic republics, citizenship laws continue to be a matter of 
controversy.   
 
Methodologically, I wish to address the relationship between rationality and emotion 
within the process of state disintegration and reconstruction.  For this topic and this 
region, I would argue that it is necessary to consider both.  Here, ethnic politics mixes 
reason with anger, resentment, and contempt.   
 
There is hardly a single group in the region that does not feel a sense of victimhood and 
resulting anger.  A core element of identity in the Baltic states rotates around Soviet 
deportations and killings; in Bosnia, various ethnic cleansings dominate republic and 
local politics; Albanian identity is shaped by Serbian discrimination and the forced mass 
exodus of 1999.  The horror of the Second World War still casts a shadow over the 
region.  Violence and a memory of violence affect the political processes involved with 
identity change through both reason and emotion.  Rationally, violence affects 
expectations and destroys the foundations for trust.  Emotionally, anger destroys the 
ability to adopt new common identities.  How can one adopt a common identity category 
with members of a group who are associated with killing and domination?  As Steve Van 
Evera asserts, violence can harden identities to the point that they resemble 
primordialism.1   
 
                                                 
1 Steve Van Evera, "Primordialism Lives!" Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of 
the American Political Science Association, 12 (Winter 2001): 20-22. 
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As I have argued elsewhere, the emotion of resentment has had a ubiquitous presence in 
the politics of Eastern Europe.2  The nature of modernization (rural peoples speaking one 
language displacing urban residents speaking another), along with the occupation policies 
of the Second World War and the ethno-federal systems of Communist rule combined to 
create a high level of ethnic awareness and sense of ethnic hierarchy in the region.  To a 
significant extent, identity policies during the disintegration of states in the 1990's aimed 
to establish the dominance of one group over another.  For instance, some languages 
became "official" languages while others would no longer be used for administrative 
purposes.  New citizenship laws determined who and who wasn't a legitimate resident of 
the state.  The composition of police forces and bureaucracies shifted.  Resentment, an 
emotion resulting from a sense of unjust domination, has resulted.  
 
 In this paper, however, I wish to primarily discuss the role of two other related emotions-
-anger and contempt.  Both have significantly altered, and continue to affect, the ethnic 
demography of Eastern Europe.  This paper will build upon the combinatorial framework 
introduced by Chandra and Boulet in Chapter 5 and  the model found in Chapter 6--"A 
Baseline Model of Change in an Activated Ethnic Demography."  Both of these chapters 
are built on assumptions of rational choice.  As they state, " We do assume that ordinary 
voters and political entrepreneurs are instrumental actors who make decisions through a 
process of conscious calculation of the payoffs associated with  alternative categories, 
and that, no matter what the nature of their motivations and payoffs, individuals will 
prefer to be in the smallest winning majority for which they are eligible.."  (Chandra and 
Boulet, Chapter 6, p. 9)  While this assumption provides a coherent baseline, for certain 
phenomena related to state disintegration and reconstruction, it does not capture the 
important effects of emotion described above.   
 
There are four sections to the paper.  First, I will relate Chandra's framework in the 
introduction to the subject of state collapse and reconstruction by creating a six-stage 
sequence. Second, I will show the general applicability of many of the features of the 
Chandra model through the example of Moldovan identity politics.  Third, I will make 
some general observations about the relationship between emotion and interest.  Fourth, I 
will show how Chandra and Boulet's specific model of ethnic demographic change can be 
modified to take into account the effects of the emotion of anger that is an important 
force in many cases involving violence.  Fifth, I will discuss the emotion of contempt.  
Brief concluding comments follow. 
 
1.  Outline of Chandra’s Framework in Relationship to State Disintegration  
Chandra provides us with a new set of definitions for the discussion of identity creation.  
A category is a term of description.  Categories are composed of one or several qualifying 
characteristics that are termed attributes.  “Attribute-dimensions are an array of mutually 
exclusive attribute-values which belong to the same family and encompass all of a 
specified population.  “Category-dimensions” are an array of mutually exclusive 
categories which belong to the same family and encompass  all of a specified population.  
As they state, “The basic building block of our theories of ethnic identity change should 
                                                 
2 Roger Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth Century 
Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
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be this repertoire of attribute-values and attribute-dimensions (for both individuals and 
populations) rather than a repertoire of categories and category-dimensions. Categories 
and category-dimensions are derived from this repertoire of attributes (p. 10)”  
 
What role does a state play in this definitional scheme?  In many multiethnic entities, the 
state is crucial in forming and maintaining  attribute-dimensions and category-
dimensions.  In the introductory chapter, Chandra uses Yugoslavia as an example.  In 
former Yugoslavia, there was a category-dimension of “nation” composed of the 
categories of Serb-Croat-Macedonian-Montenegrin-Slovene-Muslim.  The state 
determined the qualifying attributes for membership in these categories, and constructed 
and maintained this category-dimension  through its institutions.  Most importantly, each 
of these nations had representation and power through republic level government.  The 
state often tinkered with this dimension through changes in census categories and 
political upgrading of autonomous republics like Kosovo; a small percentage of the 
population called themselves Yugoslavs.  However, for most of the post-war period, this 
state-based dimension of identity categories remained fairly stable.  An individual’s 
perception of the most relevant family of identity categories could not ignore this reality.  
The stability of the state meant the stability of this dimension and its categories.  In turn, 
the attributes composing categories were relatively stable.  The inherent attributes of 
language and religion (or former religion) were the most obvious qualifying 
characteristics. 
 
What does the disintegration of a state mean in this definitional scheme?  The collapse of 
the state means the end of the institutions that maintained dimensions.  Perceptions of 
families of categories are disrupted and no longer make sense.  While the impact of state 
disintegration on old dimensions is at least somewhat clear, changes at the level of 
attribute and category are not.  When a state disintegrates and a category-dimension 
collapses, categories and attributes may also lose their meaning and coherence.  Chandra 
traces a process building from attributes to categories, and the placing of categories on 
category-dimensions.  But there may be a reverse process with the collapse of a category-
dimension leading to a collapse of categories and a “loosening” of attributes.  If attributes 
become “free-floating,” that is, divorced from their connection to a category, identity 
entrepreneurs then have an enhanced ability to recombine them to form new categories.  
The task here is to identify the constraints on such strategies and specify when those 
constraints operate.   
 
The following schema represents one possible interpretation of the process of state 
disintegration.  Six stages are specified.   
 
1. Relatively stable categories ordered into one or more category-dimensions exist before 
disintegration.  Before the state disintegrates, individuals identify themselves with 
existing categories comprised of one or several attributes.  It is important to note that 
Chandra discusses only inherited attributes in their framework.  As they define it, an 
inherited attribute is a "characteristic that an individual acquires at birth from her parents 
or ancestors."  The key distinction is that an inherited attribute is based on a shared rather 
than private knowledge.  Thus, Chandra holds that the set of feasible attributes are those 
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that are "either visibly displayed on the person or about which there is a collective record 
(p. 8)."   
 
2. A variety of factors come into play to diminish and destroy the state.  Economic 
decline and crisis, institutional factors, the end of ideology, changes in the international 
security system and other factors may drive the state toward disintegration.  
Compounding the matter, changes in identities themselves may help bring down the state.  
As evidenced by the differences among Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia, this 
process may or may not involve violence.   
 
3. Attributes are loosened from stable categories.  As state-based dimensions collapse, 
categories can also start to lose their meaning and disintegrate.  The specific attributes 
that comprised these categories can become available for recombination into new 
categories.  Also, new attributes or attributes not formerly part of old categories become 
part of the mix.  For example, religious attributes that were taboo under an old 
Communist order may now come into play.  In short, there may be a large feasible set of 
"floating attributes." 
 
4. Identity entrepreneurs string "floating" attributes together.  Periods of disintegration 
should provide ideal conditions for identity entrepreneurs.  Under these conditions, 
identity entrepreneurs choose among a set of attributes to create new identity categories 
that will attract the support of a winning coalition.  Multiple identity entrepreneurs may 
exist to offer many new categories to the general population.   
 
5. Individuals in the general population choose the best possible category to enhance their 
goals.  Given the set of categories developed by identity entrepreneurs, individuals will 
choose the category best suited to achieve basic goals.  Often, this choice will simply 
involve coordination of identity choice with others.   
 
6. Categories become relatively stable once again.  A new state usually forms a set of 
institutions that helps create, maintain, and give meaning to categories.  In effect, new 
category-dimensions are formed.  The system of attributes, categories, and attribute and 
category dimensions moves toward relative stability. 
 
Within this schema, the rational choices emphasized by Chandra are found in the fourth 
and fifth stages.  Making a rational choice can be defined in terms of relationships 
between desires (preferences), information, belief formation, and action.  Rational choice 
says little about the content of desires but insists that they be stable and consistent.  The 
individual then seeks information relevant to desired goals.  Based on this information, a 
belief is formed about the best method or strategy to achieve the goal.  An optimizing 
action results.   
 
In Chandra's framework, this rational action cycle can be seen running twice.  Political 
entrepreneurs desire certain things--votes, mobilization for a movement or a riot, recruits 
for a civil war.  They seek information relevant to their goals.  One key source of this 
information is the distribution of inherited attributes in the population.  The political 
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entrepreneur then becomes an identity entrepreneur.  This actor forms a belief that it is 
possible to string together a combination of attributes most likely to attract the support of 
an optimal coalition.  A set of actions follows.  The identity entrepreneur then assigns the 
combination of attributes a name, imbues the name with meaning, and works to maintain 
the category by making sure those adopting the name receive payoffs.   
 
The rational choice cycle then turns a second time among individuals in the mass.  
Individuals desire to be in the winning coalition.  They then seek information about how 
to be in the winning coalition.  One key source of information is the nature of existing 
categories and the attributes that make up those categories.  Individuals then form beliefs 
about which categories will best help them reach their desired goals.  An action follows.  
The individual tries to acquire the attributes of the winning category.  In the third chapter 
of this volume, Chandra and Boulet develop a model based on Riker’s theory of 
minimum winning coalitions that specifies possibilities for change in an ethnic 
demography based on the choices made during this cycle.   
 
2.  An Example: The Breakdown and Reconstruction of Moldavia/Moldova 
The transformation of Soviet Moldavia into Moldova conforms to the general contours of 
the breakdown and reconstruction outlined above.   
 
Relatively stable categories ordered into category- dimensions exist before 
disintegration.  Although the history of present day Moldova is complex, the Soviet state 
was effective in creating relatively stable identity-categories arrayed on the dimension of 
“nationality.”  The Russian Empire gained control of the Romanian-speaking region from 
nominal Ottoman control in 1812 and named it Bessarabia.  In the turmoil at the end of 
the First World War, a Bessarabian assembly voted for unification with Romania.  The 
Soviet Union never accepted the loss of this territory, however, and responded by 
creating a Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic on the left bank of the Dniester River.  
Although Romanian speakers were a minority on this territory, the entity symbolized the 
continuing Soviet claims on Bessarabia.3  The Second World War allowed the Soviets to 
act on their claim.  In a secret protocol attached to the Molotov-Ribbentrop accord, the 
region was assigned to the Soviet Union.  Soviet control was brief as Romania recovered 
the territory with the German invasion of the USSR in 1941.  The tables turned again 
when the Soviet Union took control of the area from Romania after the conclusion of 
World War II.  The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was formed from historic 
Bessarabia and a sliver of land on the Eastern bank of the Dniester River that had 
comprised the interwar Moldavian Soviet Republic.  Romanian speakers made up only 
thirty per cent of this eastern territory.4  
                                                 
3 Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001), p. 132. 
4 This brief historical gloss leaves out many significant details.  For summaries (with slightly different 
treatments) of the complex history and politics of Moldova, see Daria Fane, “Moldova: Breaking Loose 
from Moscow,” in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 121-153; Jonathan Eyl and Graham Smith, “Moldova and 
the Moldovans,” in The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, Graham Smith, ed., (London: 
Longman, 1996), pp. 223-244; Alla Skvortsova, “The Cultural and Social Makeup of Moldova: A Bipolar 
or Dispersed Society?” in Pal Kolsto, ed., National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet 
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When the Soviets gained control in 1944, they immediately set out to construct a new 
identity category of “Moldovian” to separate the region from Romania. In order to create 
this category, they first attempted to subtract Romanian from the attribute-dimension of 
language and replace it with the supposedly distinct language of “Moldovan.”  
"Moldovans" were told that they spoke their own language, not Romanian.  Accordingly, 
the alphabet was changed from Latin to Cyrillic.  The flow of literature from neighboring 
Romania was strictly controlled.  History books were rewritten to emphasize the 
distinctiveness and continuity of Moldovan culture.  The new nationality category of 
“Moldovan” then was created, in which membership was based on speaking the 
“Moldovan” language. 
 
Corresponding to policy throughout the rest of the Soviet state, all Soviet citizens were 
required to declare a nationality and the category was on all identity documents.  In 
Moldova, the membership criteria for the nationality category included those who spoke 
the newly defined language of “Moldovan” but also had room for those who spoke other 
languages. “Romanian” meanwhile was effectively obliterated from the category-
dimension of “nationality.”  Table one below shows figures for both Soviet passport and 
ethnic self-awareness in Moldova.  Note that only .1% entered “Romanian”  as their 
nationality despite a higher proportion of those who were aware of themselves as 
“ethnically” Romanian.  But, as we see, 63.5% of the population, presumably many of 
them speaking the language once identified as “Romanian,”  entered “Moldovan” in the 
Soviet passport. Because this figure is larger than the 58% of those who felt themselves 
to be ethnically “Moldovan” we can surmise that it included those who spoke other 
languages.  In fact, as we will see shortly in Table 2, almost a fifth of those who declared 
themselves “Moldovan” by nationality did not think in the “Moldovan” language and 
many of these were Russian speakers.   
 
 
Table 1 Soviet Nationality versus Ethnic Self-Awareness  
   
Moldova  Soviet Passport (N= 1200) Self-Awareness (N= 
1200) 
   
Moldova
n 
 63.5 58  
Romania
n 
 0.1 3.4  
Ukrainia
n 
 12.1 11.1  
Russian  13.3 12.8  
                                                                                                                                                 
Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 
pp. 159-196; Igor Munteanu, “Social Multipolarity and Political Violence,” in Pal Kolsto, ed., National 
Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova (Lanham, 
Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 197-231. 
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Gagauz  3.4 3.6  
Bulgarian  2.1 2.1  
Jewish  0.9 0.7  
Belarusia
n 
 0.3 -  
Roma  0.3 -  
Polish  0.3 -  
German  0.3 0.3  
No Passport 3.3 -  
Other  0.3 1.1  
Mixed  6.8  
   
Table from: Pal Kolsto, ed.; National Integration and Violent Conflict in 
Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002) p. 33. 
      
      
 
 
A variety of factors come into play to diminish and destroy the state.  The demise of the 
Soviet state need not be discussed here.  Specific features of Soviet administration would 
play critical roles in the nature of the Moldavian SSR's collapse, though.  The Soviet 
Fourteenth Army, as well as a disproportionate share of the Moldavian Republic's heavy 
industry, was located on the left bank.  With the decline of the Soviet state and its system 
of central planning, the interests of both elites and mass on the east region of Moldova 
were highly threatened. 
 
Attributes are loosened from stable categories and identity entrepreneurs string 
"floating" attributes together.  During perestroika and the decline of party control, the 
meaning of the language attribute was transformed.  Nationalist organizations arose to 
challenge the claim that a Moldovan language really differed from Romanian.  Identity 
entrepreneurs had clear incentives to pick up on these nationalist themes concerning 
language.  Partly because of their concentration in urban areas and on the more heavily 
industrialized left bank, Russians and Ukrainians tended to dominate key positions in 
industry and politics.  In one list of key positions in leading plants and institutes in 1980, 
Moldovans held only 4 of 69 positions.5  Furthermore, the mass of Romanian/Moldovan 
speakers was threatened by creeping linguistic Russification.  The relative power of the 
Russian language versus the Moldovan language can be seen in the language repertoires 
of other minorities.  According to one survey one hundred per cent of Ukrainian 
respondents declared that Russian was either the language that they thought in (49.6%) or 
a language they were fluent in (50.4%).  On the other hand, less than one in six of these 
Ukrainian respondents claimed to have bothered to learn Moldovan fluently (0.8% 
thought in Moldovan and 14.3% claimed fluency).   
  
                                                 
5 Munteanu, p. 204. 
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In 1988, Moldovan groups stated three demands—the recognition that Moldovan and 
Romanian are the same language, the reinstitution of the Latin script, and the recognition 
of the Romanian language as the state’s language.  After much struggle, all three became 
reality.  For clarity, however, I will refer to the Romanian language spoken by 
Moldovans simply as Moldovan throughout the rest of this section Although the rights of 
minorities would be respected, all members of the state administration would be obliged 
to know and speak Romanian in their duties.  Graham Smith sums up the larger 
significance of the move toward making language the dominant indicator of identity in 
Moldova: 
 
. . . it amounted to extracting an open admission from their government that the 
republic was theirs and theirs alone, and that all other ethnic groups in Moldova 
were not ‘nations’ but rather ethnic minorities whose rights should be respected 
but whose claims could not be considered equal to the interests of the majority.  
The concept of a ‘Moldovan’ at last had a meaning.6 
 
Table Two7 shows respective total percentages for language (the language one thinks in) 
and nationality in Moldova.   
 
    Language  
Identity Total Moldovan Russian Other  
Moldovan 61.4 50.2 6 5.2  
Russian 12.8 0.4 11.3 1.1  
Ukrainian 11.1 0.1 5.5 5.5  
Other 14.7 4.1 3.5 7.1  
      
Table 2: Moldava Nationalist and Linguistic Breakdown (percent) 
 
 
 
In effect, Moldovan entrepreneurs were redefining the membership criteria for the 
nationality category “Moldovan,” replacing an expansive combination of attributes on the 
dimension of language (“Moldovan-speaking” or Russian-speaking or other)  with a 
restrictive one (only Moldovan).  As shown in the Table 2, a little over fifty percent of 
the population used Moldovan as the language they thought in.  Only one in about six 
Russians and Ukrainians considered themselves fluent in Moldovan,8 and, as shown by 
the Table Two, practically none of them thought in Moldovan.  A large pool of key 
positions would now be transferred to the Moldovan speakers.  Furthermore, the language 
                                                 
6 Smith, p. 223. 
7 Derived from Pal Kolsto and Olav Melberg, “Integration, Alienation, and Conflict in Estonia and 
Moldova,” in ., National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia 
and Moldova (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002).  The language scores represent 
answers to what language the respondent thinks in.    
8 Pal Kolsto and Olav Melberg, “Integration, Alienation, and Conflict in Estonia and Moldova,” in ., 
National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), p. 62, see Table 2.41. 
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move provided the possibility of unification of Moldova with Romania.  Note from Table 
2 that there is no alternative winning coalition that could be initiated by those defined by 
Russian or Ukrainian nationality and language.  Prospects became increasingly bleak for 
Russophones.  
 
Along the lines of constructivist premises, identity entrepreneurs were at work to counter 
the consequences of the move to language.  As a first response, non-Moldovan speakers 
sought a political solution through alliance with Moscow.  They also initiated a series of 
strikes in the Russophone areas.  With little success in intimidating Moldovan 
nationalists, the next option was partition of the emerging new Moldovan state.  On 
September 2, 1990, a Dniester Republic comprising the largely Russophone areas on the 
left bank, as well as the largely Russophone city of Bender, was declared.   
 
The identity politics of this new creation were in some ways remarkable.  Neither 
language nor the existing nationality attributes adequately capture the salient identity that 
emerged.  Rather, a new "Soviet" nationality defined a Dniestrian.  In effect, the Russian, 
Ukrainian and other minority nationality labels merged into the new "Soviet" nationality. 
A small number of Moldovans also adopted this identity attribute.  Grigore Maracuta, at 
one point the Transnitrian Parliamentary Chairman, chose to migrate because he felt 
more comfortable with the Soviet-oriented ideology on the left bank.9   As Stuart 
Kaufman sums up, "The Transnitrian Russophones were the group, including Russified 
Moldovans and Ukrainians as well as Russians, that considered Russian its language and 
the Soviet Union its country."10 In effect, a Dniestrian can be anyone who does not 
identify with both the Moldovan nationality and the Moldovan language. Tables Three 
and Four show the language and nationality figures for the right and left banks. 
 
    Language 
Identity Total Moldovan Russian Other 
Moldovan 74.7 61.1 7.3 6.3
Russian 7.8 0.3 6.9 0.6
Ukrainian 9.7 0.1 4.8 4.8
Other 7.8 2.1 1.9 3.8
 
Table 3: Moldova Nationalist and Linguistic Breakdown on the Right Bank (percent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Kaufman, p. 147.  American political scientist Charles King and David Laitin also concur that a 
hybrid identity emerged in Dniestria.     
10 Kaufman, p. 130  
 10
    Language 
Nationality Total Moldovan Russian Other 
Moldovan 29.9 24.5 2.9 2.5 
Russian 40.7 1.4 35.9 3.4 
Ukrainian 24.5 0.2 12.15 12.15 
Other 4.9 1.3 1.2 2.4 
 
Table 4: Moldova Nationalist and Linguistic Breakdown on the  Left Bank (PMR) 
(percent) 
 
Essentially, about a quarter or third of the population in each case could be denied full 
access to a variety of pay-offs.  On the left bank, the excluded group is basically the 
24.5% of the population located in the Moldovan language/Moldovan nationality 
category.  On the right bank, those not fluent in the Moldovan language were excluded 
from several economic and political benefits.  In terms of Chandra's model, this outcome 
supports maximizing behavior.  In both cases, the result represented a stable minimum 
winning coalition that rewarded members with an increased share of society's goods.11   
 
Note, however, that there were other “minimum winning combinations” in the Left Bank 
that were not considered feasible options.  Additional factors, as well as domestic 
demography, need to be taken into account in explaining why these counterfactuals were 
ruled out .   In the case of the Left Bank, the smallest coalition would have been 
composed of just Russian speakers (52.15%).   Two issues eliminated the option of a 
Russian-speaking coalition from consideration.  First, because Russian and Ukrainian are 
such close languages, distinctions based on this cleavage would be difficult to enforce. 
This suggests that “visibility” may perhaps be an important restriction defining the 
“operative repertoire” of minimum winning categories in this context.  Second, the 
Dniester government could ill afford to antagonize neighboring Ukraine through 
discrimination against Ukrainian speakers.  In fact, in order to appease the international 
community as a whole, leaders on the Left Bank needed to avoid overtly discriminatory 
politics.  Given these constraints, Dniestrian elites arguably did the best they could in 
forming a minimum winning coalition.  In theory, furthermore, Moldovans could have 
united with Ukrainians on nationality to form a smaller minimum winning coalition.  
However, in reality the separation of Russians and Ukrainians on this score would be 
extremely difficult given their intertwined histories and general russification.  Other 
combinations too which could produce the right numbers were not viable options.  For 
instance, Russian nationality could be combined in a category with Other-speakers 
(essentially Ukrainian speakers).  However, such a category would exclude Russian 
speaking Ukrainians.  It seems unlikely that Russians nationals would accept Ukrainian 
speaking Ukrainians but exclude Russian speaking Ukrainians 
 
Individuals in the general population choose the best possible category to enhance their 
goals.  Soon, militias formed on each side. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
                                                 
11 This argument applies, I believe, whether the language numbers are in terms of "thinking in the 
language," as represented in the tables above, or in terms of answers regarding "fluency."  
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1991, the situation lapsed into civil war.  The situation compelled most citizens to pick a 
side. With the support of the Russian Fourteenth Army, the Dniestrians repelled attacks 
from right bank regime and the situation eventually stabilized.  The civil war, however, 
resulted in 1,200 dead and 6,000 wounded.   
 
Categories become relatively stable once again. In some ways, the level of stability of 
post-partition Moldova is remarkable.  At the time of this writing (January 2005), almost 
no analyst can imagine a new outbreak of violence in the foreseeable future.  It is also 
notable that the nationality hybrid created on the left bank during the waning days of the 
Soviet state has survived the end of the Soviet state that it was based on.  Identity 
entrepreneurs create new histories of the Dniestrian people. For instance, the Second 
Congress of Dniester local Soviets declared in 1990: 
 
The Congress views the historical processes that have taken place on our ancient 
land since the time of Kievan Rus as the formation of a coethnos that now 
inhabits the southwestern part of the country (the USSR).  This coethnos is made 
up of descendants of the inhabitants from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, 
Germany, Greece, and other countries.12 
 
This coethnic mythology still reigns. Identity is not based on language in the Dniestrian 
Republic.  Russian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian are all official languages, even though in 
practice Russian is dominant. 
 
On the right bank, all predictions that Moldovans would soon unify with Romania have 
proven unfounded.  New institutions have been formed which provide pay-offs to those 
in new positions of authority.  As Smith points out about the situation in independent 
Moldova,”(N)ew and highly prestigious occupational niches were created for Moldova’s 
intellectual elites with statehood who realized that their interests would be best served 
through securing the survival of an independent Moldova.”13  For Moldovans, a merger 
with a large mass of fellow Romanian speakers, especially those in a poor and 
impoverished state like Romania did not seem to assure higher pay-offs than those 
awarded to Romanian speakers in Moldova.  In retrospect, it is not surprising that 
Moldovans have remained independent from Romania. 
 
Along the lines of Chandra’s and Boulet’s model, the stable partition of Moldova results 
from two stable coalitions.  There is little incentive for elites to destabilize the situation.  
Along lines of the fifth stage in the sequence, there is also little incentive for individuals 
in the mass to deviate.  Neither the remaining russophones in Moldova not those 
identifying with both the Moldovan language and nationality in Dniestria have the 
numbers to politically challenge the status quo. 
 
In sum, the general progression of events conforms to the six stages above.  The Soviet 
Union did possess a relatively stable set of identity categories based on the dimension of 
nationality.  State institutions, such as ethno-federal territories, helped perpetuate a stable 
                                                 
12 Quoted by Skvortsova, p. 175. 
13 Smith, p. 240. 
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demography.  With the breakdown of the Soviet central state, attributes could take on 
new meanings.  Moldovan identity entrepreneurs enhanced the salience of language in 
order to create a minimum winning coalition that would shift resources and jobs to a 
relatively small majority.  Russophone identity entrepreneurs countered with their own 
strategy.  Individuals in the general population conformed.  A relatively straightforward 
story about the disintegration and reconstruction of Moldova can be told relying solely on 
rational choice assumptions and mechanisms.   
 
However, there are aspects of this story, and especially of the stories that have emerged 
from the Yugoslav wars, that remain somewhat inexplicable without reference to 
emotion.  One such point relates to the stability of Moldova's partition.  Rationality alone 
seems insufficient to explain the stability of this new state.  The Dniestrian Republic is 
not internationally recognized.  Its economy is in dire straits with little prospect for 
improvement.  In 1995, the average monthly wage in Dniestria was seven to ten US 
dollars making it one of the poorest regions in the former USSR.  Even though elites may 
be able to obtain a large share of Dniestrian goods, the pathetic state of the economy 
would not seem to make this option so attractive.  Long-term prospects would appear to 
favor reconciliation with Moldova and another round of identity change involving a new 
common identity.  The reason this option is not taken, at least in part, probably stems 
from the 1,200 dead and the civil war that occurred in the recent past.  In short, the 
emotion of anger may still cast a cloud over reconciliation and new identity dynamics.  
This is the subject of the next section.   
 
3.  General Comments about Emotion and Interest 
A common saying in the United States goes, “Never get so mad that it costs you 
money.”14 But of course the saying exists because our emotions often do get in the way 
of our material interest.  Emotions, rather than monetary interests, often come to drive the 
progression of divorce suits and disputes over wills.  When strong emotions pervade 
decisions, individuals come to ignore relevant information and form irrational beliefs 
through wishful thinking, or they simply can’t bring themselves to do actions that they 
may in fact know are in their material interest. 
 
In my own fieldwork in Kosovo, I have met Serbs whose property has ended up on the 
Albanian side of ethnic divisions.  They have known for several years that it would be in 
their interest to sell the property and move on with their lives; they have no expectations 
of returning to live on the property and little expectation of receiving a higher price in the 
future.  In the meantime, they often live in the squalid conditions of refugee life.  For 
some, the emotion of hopelessness may have produced inaction.  However, others are 
driven by the emotion of spite.  They cannot stand thinking about how Albanians will 
benefit from Serbian suffering and dispossession.  As the years pass, however, more and 
more of them will sell.  Spite, like many other emotions, has a half life.  It is subject to 
decay over time.  While the emotion erodes, interests remain.   
 
In the Balkans, emotions have also been tied to the surrender of war criminals to the 
Hague and the issuance of apologies for wartime atrocities.  For instance, it would have 
                                                 
14 My father gave me this advice, and I have heard it elsewhere, so I believe it is common.   
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been in the material interests of Serbs to admit to wrongdoing and fully cooperate with 
the international bodies immediately after the fall of Milosevic.  However, a significant 
segment of the population saw these actions as humiliations.  Serbian resentment against 
the unjust dominance of the West supported Kostunica’s policy of refusing complete 
cooperation on these issues.  Slowly, the Serbs. Like the Croats, will eventually bow to 
international pressure thus and receive the international rewards that they have foregone 
for many years.  Resentment will fade, economic and political interests will remain.  But 
the process takes years to play out. 
 
Many emotions have half-lives and their force erodes.  Anger, the focus of the next 
section, like spite and resentment, is such an emotion.  Other emotions do not possess this 
property, but are based on stable cognitions which can support fairly constant 
dispositions.  As discussed below, ethnic contempt is an emotion defined by a cognition 
that a target group is inherently inferior or defective and the action tendency is to shun 
that group.  The emotion can be the foundation of exclusionary and hierarchical social 
systems.  The cognitions and beliefs that produce this emotion can go on indefinitely.  In 
fact, they are often handed down to one’s children and as a result ethnic contempt can 
sustain social separation across generations.   
 
Ethnic contempt, like the emotions defined by half-lives, can conflict with economic 
interest.  Consider the case of American professional baseball leagues.  Until the late 
1940’s, no major league team allowed Black players.  No formal rule existed; the ban 
was only sustained by a “gentleman’s agreement” that in turn was partially supported by 
social stigmas against Blacks and the intermixing of races. When the color line was 
broken, teams had incentives to recruit the best players from the Negro Leagues.  Those 
teams with the most racist ownership that still avoided Blacks often began to lose more 
games.15  There was a cost to ethnic contempt.  The only remedy for these teams was to 
also recruit Black players.16 Eventually, all teams began to seek the best players 
regardless of race.  Correspondingly, along lines of the contact hypothesis, racism on the 
field, if not the front office, largely disappeared.  Here, material interest drove 
cooperation that in turn diminished the emotion.   
 
To come back the central issue of this chapter, emotions are clearly a central focus of 
political leaders when attempting the reconstruction of states.  Perhaps the most famous 
speech in US history is Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address.  In anticipating the 
difficulties that lie ahead in reconciling North and South after the end of the Civil War, 
Lincoln concluded his speech with the words “with malice toward none.”  Unfortunately, 
                                                 
15 This point is often made in reference to the Boston Red Sox.  The Yawkey owned club was often seen as 
racist and Black players were scarce.  This fact is often cited as a primary reason for the failure to win the 
World Series for 86 years.  This point is a major issue in a recent HBO documentary film.  For other teams, 
the incentives to recruit Black players often went beyond victories on the field.  The Busch family, famous 
as brewers of Budweiser Beer, owned the St. Louis Cardinals during the period of integration.  August 
Busch directed the team to recruit Blacks because “Blacks drink beer” and it would be excellent advertising 
and public relations to have several Black players.  See Ken Halberstam (Book on the 1964 World Series).   
16 Also see Lawrence Summers’ January 2005 speech about women and the sciences in academia.  He 
makes the argument, unsurprisingly given his background as an economist, that barriers to women in terms 
of prejudice should not exist due to competitive pressures. 
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as Lincoln undoubtedly knew, the presence of malice after bloody civil conflict is usually 
pervasive, a point which leads into a discussion of anger. 
 
4.  Anger 
In his article "Primordialism Lives!" Stephen Van Evera discusses factors that impede 
identity change.  He writes: 
 
Conflict enhances the hardening effect of mass literacy on identity by enhancing 
the emotional impact of recorded national memories.  The experience of warring 
or oppressed peoples, filled as it is with tales of common struggle and sacrifice for 
the common good, creates a stronger we-feeling than the experience of people 
who escape these tragedies; hence it has stronger effects when national scribes 
record and purvey it. 
 For this reason groups in conflict are especially poor candidates for 
identity change, and identity change is an especially unlikely remedy for ethnic 
conflict.17 
 
A common feature of state collapse is the possibility and reality of violence.18  In turn, 
violence creates anger.  The current politics of reconstruction in Bosnia are almost 
certainly hampered by anger.  Serbs, Croats, and Muslims do not hold each other in 
contempt.  It would be hard for such racially, linguistically, and culturally similar groups 
to see each other as inherently defective.  But they do see each other's actions during the 
war as brutal and despicable. Given the tens or hundreds of thousands killed, the 
hundreds of thousands of refugees, and the existence of concentration camps and mass 
rape, it would be impossible not to hold this cognition.  Among many Bosnians of all 
backgrounds, the emotion of anger has heightened the desire to punish the other side 
rather than cooperate.  The result does not appear to be in the best interests of the 
population.  Bosnia's GDP per capita is on par with some of the poorest states in the 
world.  Its level of $1800 per capita GDP is far below its 1990 level.  Some might hold 
that the problem simply lies with the lack of proper incentives.  However, international 
administrators have tried a wide variety of rewards, penalties, and threats in an effort to 
create a new common Bosnian identity.  Thus far, they have had little success.  More than 
likely, the emotional baggage of the war and atrocities is a major factor in preventing any 
such shift. 
 
Emotion is a mechanism that explains shifts in motivation.  When under the influence of 
emotion, individuals modify what they want.  Sometimes emotions act as "switches--an 
emotion may heighten one desire above all others even if the action that results damages 
the long-term interests of the individual.  In other situations, emotion works to diminish 
or enhance an interest.  Specific emotions can be distinguished by two qualities—
cognition and action tendency.  Fear is the cognition of danger with an action tendency 
                                                 
17 Van Evera, "Primordialism Lives!" Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the 
American Political Science Association, 12 (Winter 2001): 20-22. 
18 Two stages seem most likely to see violence.  As in Moldova, the introduction of new attributes may 
provoke a backlash.  In other cases that are in a final stage of stabilization, losers in the process may use 
violence to disrupt the emerging equilibrium.   
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for fight or flight.  The three emotions mentioned in the introduction can be discussed in 
these terms.  Anger is the cognition that an agent has committed a blameworthy action 
against you; the action tendency is to punish that agent.  Contempt forms from the 
cognition that an object or group is inherently defective; the action tendency is to shun 
that object or group.  Resentment is the cognition that one is in an unjust status position 
vis-à-vis other individuals or groups; the action tendency is to commit actions that reduce 
the status of these individuals or groups.   
 
These emotions can also be linked to social interactions.  If I think that individuals with 
attribute X are threatening, the emotion of fear results when I meet them.  I become more 
psychologically and physically ready to commit certain defensive actions.  In the 
remaining sections, I will show how these emotions, in conjunction with the rational 
interest based model of Chandra and Boulet affect changes in ethnic demographies during 
the processes of state disintegration and reconstruction.    
 
At this point, we can relate anger to Chandra and Boulet's model.  I refer specifically to 
Figure 6 in Chapter 3.  Here, Chandra and Boulet depict a scenario with two minimum 
winning categories.  According to the rational choice assumptions of the model, they 
"expect the initial outcome to be an ethnic demography based on the smaller of these 
minimum winning categories (p. 21)."  However, when violence produces anger, it would 
be difficult to predict that the smaller minimum winning coalition will always be chosen.  
Bosnian Muslims, for example, are currently unlikely to modify their identity repertoire 
in a way that will produce an association with Bosnian Serb perpetrators of violence.  In 
Kosovo, Albanians continue to shun any identification that would include Serbs and other 
minorities. 
 
Does this mean that cases of violence are likely to breed the near-primordialism that Van 
Evera predicts?  This need not be the case.  Event-based emotions, unlike object-based 
emotions, are likely to fade with time.  Interest, on the other hand, does not.  Jon Elster 
has discussed this effect in his work on transitional justice pointing out that in the trials 
collaborators following the Second World War sentences were almost invariably more 
severe immediately after the war than two or three years later.19  This insight suggests an 
addition to Chandra and Boulet's model in the form of an "anger function."   
 
Such a function can be illustrated with reference to Chandra and Boulet’s Figure 6.  
Consider the following three variations of the same scenario.  In each case, assume that 
foreign whites have committed violence against every other category.  As a result, Blacks 
are angry at whites.  Assume further that this anger has helped create the following 
preferences in the aftermath of violence.  1) Above all, one wishes to be in a winning 
coalition.  2) Against assumptions of maximization, one prefers to share the pay-off with 
a higher number of non-perpetrators (MWC1) than a lower number that includes 
members of the perpetrator group (MWC2).  3) As anger recedes, the willingness to 
accept the costs (MWC1-MWC2) involved with the bigger coalition recedes. If the costs 
of the bigger coalition pass a certain threshold determined by the amount of time that has 
                                                 
19 See Jon Elster.  “Memory and Transitional Justice.”  Unpublished manuscript delivered at the “Memory 
of War” Workshop, MIT January 2003. 
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passed since the violent events, the individual will become ready to re-identify despite 
lingering anger 4) At a certain point, the emotion recedes altogether and has no effect 
(extinction point).   
 
 
 
 
Table 5 composed of sub-tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 (Reproduction of Chandra and Boulet’s 
Figure 6)  
 
In each case above, the optimal, that is smallest, winning coalition would include foreign 
whites.  However, anger prevents any immediate change in identity that would allow 
such a shift.  Foreign Blacks would rather coalesce with other Blacks than switch their 
identity to foreign despite that higher pay-offs such a shift could generate.  The three 
scenarios exhibit three different costs of anger.  In scenario A, the difference between 
minimum winning coalition 1 (MWC1--all Blacks) that does not include whites and 
minimum winning coalition 2 (MWC2-foreign) that would include whites is only 5%.  In 
scenario B, the difference increases to .2 and scenario C to .38.   
 
How long will individuals accept the costs of anger and exclusion?  If anger recedes, 
eventually interest will override emotion.  The population, and elites, will have incentives 
to induce identity shift.  The relationship between acceptance of lower payoffs and time 
can be modeled in different ways.  The graphs in the appendix represent "anger curves."  
Figures 1 through 4 show initial high levels of anger that recede according to linear, 
exponential, inverse exponential, and mixed exponential functions. In all figures, anger is 
assumed to become extinct in ten years.  The line represents the point at which interest 
begins to outweigh anger, where individuals no longer wish to forego the available pay-
off on account of anger.  At this point, individuals may come to think that they are 
"cutting off their nose to spite their face, that it is “time to get on with things,” to “bury 
the hatchet.”  The English language is filled with metaphors that capture these ubiquitous 
qualities of human nature. We might also expect to see various reconstructions of history 
at this point.  For instance, in order to justify an identity shift that includes members of a 
former perpetrator group, elites might be expected to claim that the group “wasn’t really 
that bad” and that “they were manipulated by evil leaders.” 
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The linear model suggests that anger recedes steadily and consistently.  The exponential 
function suggests that the original anger maintains itself for a considerable amount of 
time and then fades quickly.  The reverse exponential function indicates that the initial 
high level of anger fades quickly but then lingers at some level for a long time.  The 
mixed function models a sustained initial high level of anger followed by a rapid drop 
and then a lingering phase where anger remains a low level remnant of social interaction.   
 
An important point here is that they would make different predictions in terms of ethnic 
demographic shift.  With the linear function, the population would be ready for a shift 
from Black to foreign in nine years in scenario A, six years in scenario B, and just 2.4 
years in scenario C.  The respective numbers for all the functions are:  
 
Linear: 9, 6, 2.4 
Exponential: 9.5, 7.7, 4.9 
Inverse Exponential: 6.9, 3.7, 1.3 
Mixed Exponential: 7.8, 5.5, 3.45 
 
This exercise yields the insight that identities are more likely to resist change when the 
difference among pay-offs is small.  Under these assumptions, if there is a sizable 
difference in pay-offs between equilibria and if anger recedes exponentially, we should 
expect a very rapid switch in the saliency of identity (1.3 years in the example above).  
On the other hand, if the pay-off is low, sub-optimal identities may be maintained for the 
length of the existence of anger. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive.  One might 
think that small differences might be overcome more rapidly than large ones, but the 
analysis here suggests that the avoidance of high costs primarily drives the outcome.   
 
Of course, different levels of violence produce different intensities of anger.  The initial 
point and extinction points of the curves would need to change correspondingly.   
 
Modeling Anger after Extreme Violence 
Primordialists might claim that often nations are created through genocidal levels of 
violence or long historical periods of domination.  These memories, as suggested by the 
Van Evera quote above, become part of history textbooks and folklore that “national 
scribes purvey and record.”  Violence becomes memory.  In turn, anger, and its effects on 
identity shift arise in generation after generation. 
 
While such criticism undoubtedly has some merit, the model above could be modified to 
address some of these issues.20  Assume that those who are alive at the time of genocidal 
violence retain a constant high level of anger their entire lives.  Assume further that they 
pass down the memory of victimhood to following generations and that the individuals in 
these following generations become aware of their legacy at age fifteen.  However, with 
the passage of time the ability to pass down the emotional intensity of the violence 
becomes increasingly difficult.  Time passes, new events occur.  The vividness of the 
memory of violence becomes part of a past that cannot be emotionally captured.   
 
                                                 
20 I owe most of this section to my research assistant, Mark Finlayson. 
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These elements can be captured through a series of demographic assumptions.  First 
assume a normal population distribution with a life expectancy of 65 years and a standard 
deviation of ten years.  Assume that children become aware of their cultural conceptions 
of victimhood at age 15 with a standard deviation of three years.  The product of these 
two curves yields a curve representing the "aware population."  To model the gradual 
decrease in the intensity of this culturally inherited anger, assume that the ability to hand 
down anger starts at the maximum 0.5 level (the highest possible difference between 
MWC 1 and MWC2) and decreases linearly with an extinction time of 25 years.  This 
assumption is captured graphically by Figure 5 (Genocidal MWC Differential Model).  
Thus, those born 25 years after the violent event, despite the efforts of in-group members) 
can no longer feel anger at a level that would generate acceptance of lower pay-offs in 
identity coalitions.   
 
Given these assumptions, the resulting anger function is represented by Figure 6.  Here, 
for the first twenty years after the genocidal violence, anger prevents any consideration of 
identity switch regardless of the trade-offs in terms of MWC1-MWC2.  However, as 
survivors die off and the ability to transfer the vividness and intensity of the violence to 
descendants declines, the overall population becomes less ready to maintain the losses 
created by the identity status quo.  With the higher pay-offs associated with scenario C, 
the population will be ready to shift identities in about 40 years.  It would take over 
seventy years for scenario B, and almost eighty years for scenario A.  In this example, 
anger finally dies out as a force on identity after eighty years.21   
 
Several instances of Eastern European violence would seem to have such a progression.  
In earlier research, I worked in Lithuania.  Often, when I mentioned my fieldwork to 
American Jews, they would provide me with a lecture on Lithuanian collaboration with 
the Nazis against the Jews during the Second World War.  This violence had occurred 
more than fifty years earlier, but the resulting anger had been passed down across 
generations and across the ocean.  That violence was probably playing a role in the ever-
dwindling number of Lithuania’s Jews.  The category Lithuanian and Jewish may have 
been a difficult one to accept, especially with the surge of nationalism in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet state and the reconstruction of independent Lithuania.   
 
Bosnia may provide a field of variation to see which of the above models applies.  
Identity shift in Srebrenica, the location of genocidal mass killing, may follow the second 
pattern while areas of Bosnia that saw much less violence might follow variations of the 
first.  In Kosovo, regional difference in the level of violence, for example, between Pec 
with high violence and Pristina with lower level of violence, might be used to assess the 
political nature and function of anger.   
 
5.  Contempt 
As discussed above, emotions can be defined by their cognitive antecedents and action 
tendency.  Ethnic contempt is the cognition that a group is inherently inferior or 
defective; the action tendency is to shun that group.  The emotion is closely related to the 
                                                 
21 This outcome generally obtains even with shorter extinction rates.  The demographic assumptions largely 
drive the outcome.   
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phenomenon of stigma, undoubtedly one of the ugliest features of human interaction.  In 
Chandra’s constructivist terminology, ethnic stigma can be defined as the negative 
emotional reaction to one particular attribute.  The phenomenon is perhaps most clear 
with non-ethnic attributes.  Individuals often recoil at the sight of people exhibiting signs 
of the AIDS virus.  There is a sense that there is something inherently wrong with the 
AIDS-infected individual, and the action tendency is to avoid that person.  The emotion 
of contempt is defined by this combination of a cognition that a person or group is 
inherently inferior or defective combined with an action tendency to shun that person or 
group.  At least some forms of racism also fit here.  One particular attribute, skin color in 
this case, produces a very negative emotional reaction in an out-group.  There is contempt 
for individuals with a specific skin color—those that possess that attribute are inferior 
and should be excluded from many social interactions.   
 
The sources of ethnic stigma and contempt are not always understood.  Clearly, 
institutions such as slavery and apartheid help to create and sustain racial stigmas.  In 
some instances, a history of conflict and cultural separation can convert ethnic difference 
into ethnic contempt.  Julie Mertus describes such a process as taking place in the former 
Yugoslavia as Serbs developed ethnic contempt toward Albanians in Kosovo: 
 
Kosovo was an abstraction, a set of myths in the popular imagination.  Over time, 
the nationalism became racialized, that is, difference was framed in terms of 
perceived physical differences in skin, nose, ears, IQ, sexuality.  In this sense, 
nationalism became “written on the body.”  Slurs against Kosovo Albanians 
shifted.  No longer referred to as “white hats” (alluding to the hats worn by men 
in traditional dress), a sexualized imagery of Albanian men and women was 
adopted.  In the mainstream Serbian and Yugoslav presses, Albanian men were 
declared to be rapists, although Kosovo had the lowest reported incidents of 
sexual violence in Yugoslavia.  Albanian women were portrayed as mere baby 
factories, despite statistics indicating that the childbirth rates of urban Albanian 
women and those of other urban women in Yugoslavia were nearly identical.  
Accused in the past of being culturally inferior, Albanians increasingly were 
depicted as genetically inferior as well.  This is racism of the purest sort.  (Mertus, 
p. 8).   
 
The existence of stigma is also evidenced by pejorative terms or slurs.  The actual term 
used in much of Serbia and Macedonia is usually not "Albanian" but the pejorative 
"shiptar."   In Macedonia in 2002, a school in the northwest region was re-named to 
honor an Albanian teacher.  In response, an estimated 30,000 Macedonian children 
participated in blocking the main highway between Tetovo and Skopje.  At one point the 
young protestors were reported chanting "gas chambers for the shiptars."22  The fact that 
school children employ such negative epithets is evidence of a transmission of stigma 
across generations.  Albanians in Kosovo have their own pejorative term for Serbs, 
“shkija.”  In Kosovo, the attribute of “Serb nationality” generates ethnic contempt.  In the 
                                                 
22Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Friday November 1, 2002 
(www.iwpr.net?index.pl?archive/bcr2/bcr2_20021011_5_eng.txt) 
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pogroms of March 2004, all Serbs, even the elderly, were attacked.  Regardless of the 
target’s political or social background or characteristics, simply possessing the attribute 
“Serb nationality” made the individual a legitimate target.  Despite the rhetoric of some 
Western-oriented elites, it is apparent that for the majority of Kosovo’s Albanian 
population the category “Serb” implies an inherent problem.  Serbs remain isolated in 
sealed off enclaves and association with Serbs is basically taboo.  In the south Balkans, 
some level of ethnic contempt exists toward Albanians, Serbs in some regions, and Roma 
almost everywhere.   
 
The existence of ethnic contempt and stigmatized attributes poses clear challenges to 
common thinking in constructivist approaches to ethnic groups.  Above all, ethnic 
stigmas can be a severe constraint on choice.  Constructivist theory usually emphasizes 
the fluidity of identity choice.  Elites are seen as free to create parties or platforms that 
appeal to different identities or combinations of identities.  Individuals are assumed to be 
able to emphasize the aspects of identity that further their own goals.  But ethnic stigmas 
limit choices.  Ethnic minorities possessing the stigmatized attribute cannot choose to 
have majorities end their negative emotions about that attribute.  The majorities 
themselves cannot just choose to end their emotions and prejudices.  Furthermore, 
stigmas limit the choices of political elites and identity entrepreneurs.   
 
Clearly, stigmas involve imposition of identity.  There is seldom a reason to choose to 
possess a stigmatized identity.  Although identities can be created and chosen, the general 
population is often ready to ignore the choices of some groups and impose its own 
version of identity.  Consider the case of the Egyptians in the Balkans.  There may be no 
better example of the social construction of ethnic identity than the “Egyptians” of 
Kosovo and Macedonia.23  In the late 1980’s, Slobodan Milosevic targeted Albanians as 
the source of problems in the south Balkans.  The regime stripped Albanians of their 
positions in the government. A plethora of Serb-dominated security forces made life 
difficult for Albanians in the region.  Building an identity on the attribute of “Albanian-
speaking” was not an optimal strategy.  One segment of the population began to form a 
new category in response.   
 
For some of the Albanian-speaking Roma, folklore about Egyptian origins became the 
basis of a new category.  Entrepreneurs combined a set of attributes that included 
Albanian-speaking and Muslim religion with certain demographic and historical 
characteristics.  Egyptians were different than Roma, they claimed.  Egyptians live in 
towns, have a relatively higher standard of living than Roma, and a history of specialized 
occupations.  They claimed to have a distinct culture that separated them from the 
Ashkali, (another set of Albanian-speaking Roma) as well.  As evidence, in 1991 they 
presented a book of regional Egyptian folklore to the Egyptian ambassador in Belgrade.  
In 1992, Macedonian Egyptians demanded their own radio and television programs.   
 
                                                 
23 Much of this section is from Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000).  
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Given the state of pay-offs for certain identity categories, the movement appeared to be 
astute.  The value of being a Roma is not high in political, economic, or social terms, not 
to mention the power of local stereotypes.  The value of being an Albanian at that time 
and in that place had drastically declined.  The optimal choice was to be neither Roma 
nor Albanian, but to become Egyptian.  This construction tied the group to a foreign 
country with associational benefits. For instance, they have been invited to the Egyptian 
embassy on certain holidays.  In the early 1990’s, the construction also produced 
immediate pay-offs from the ruling regimes in Belgrade and Skopje.  Milosevic, for 
obvious reasons, declared that up to half of the group calling themselves Albanians may 
in fact be Egyptian.  Serb and Macedonian academics “uncovered” new sources and 
interpreted old ones to support the claim.  This case demonstrates how identity 
entrepreneurs can string together a set of attributes to create a new category.  One set of 
upwardly mobile Albanian-speaking Roma accepted the category as a way to preserve 
and enhance their social and economic position during a period of political turmoil and 
identity flux.   
 
However, both choice and imposition mechanisms have been at play for the Roma in 
Kosovo.  The events in Mitrovica in 1999 are informative on the imposition side.  Over 
eight thousand Roma lived in a compact area in Kosovska Mitrovica on the south side of 
the Ibar River in the beginning of 1999.  The neighborhood was known as Ciganska 
Mahala and was one of the largest, wealthiest, and most stable Roma communities in all 
of Eastern Europe.  While everyone knows that Serbian forces drove hundreds of 
thousands of Albanians from Kosovo during the NATO bombing in the spring of 1999, 
few people know of the ethnic cleansing of Ciganska Mahala.  When the Albanian 
population and the Kosovo Liberation Army returned to Kosovska Mitrovica, they 
completely cleansed Ciganska Mahala.  Under the watch of NATO, the neighborhood 
burned for seven days and nights.  Not a single Roma dwelling was left standing.   
 
While some of the residents of Ciganska Mahalla might have chose to adopt the Egyptian 
identity, it appears that the majority population and its armed members did not really care 
about this choice.  There is little evidence of remorse over Ciganska Mahala.  It was a 
Roma neighborhood and, in the eyes of many of the majority population, it could be 
legitimately cleansed.  In 2002, the area was slated to become a shopping mall and 
recreation area.  As things are, violence had become the ultimate arbiter of identity.   
 
Contempt and the Reconstruction of States 
In larger states, stigmatized groups can often be marginalized in ways that make them 
inconsequential in the larger political order.  In some cases, as indicated by Ralph 
Ellison’s book, stigmatized groups can become “invisible.”  After all, the action tendency 
of contempt is to shun and ignore the object of the emotion.  However, the process of 
state breakdown and reconstruction will often create situations in which the political 
status and power of stigmatized groups become a pivotal issue.  The situation changes 
largely because state breakdown produces new demographies that increase the relative 
size of the stigmatized group.  These groups become significant both in term of their 
ability to project force and their relevance to electoral outcomes.   
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The Moldovan case provides an example where the Gagauz minority--a marginalized 
group, if not a stigmatized group—became the focus of a larger political struggle and 
ended up with an enhanced political status.  The Gagauz would seem to have been a poor 
candidate to become part of a model for ethnic tolerance.  Comprising only 150,000-
160,000 total in southern Moldova, the Gagauz are a poor, largely rural, Turkic-speaking 
Orthodox group.  While perhaps not the object of contempt in the same way as Roma or 
Kosovar Albanians, the Gagauz were certainly marginal.  During the tail end of World 
War II and the immediate post-war years, the community was the victim of both Stalinist 
repression and famine.  Culturally, the language and culture was neglected with only 
thirty-three books published in the Gagauz language during the Soviet period; Gagauz 
children were taught in the Russian language.24  During the perestroika period, Gagauz 
demands for heightened autonomy and cultural protection were met with derision by 
Moldovan legislators.  The Moldovan Supreme Soviet denied that the Gagauz were not a 
real "people" but rather, as some parliamentarians proclaimed, were "Bulgarians 
assimilated by the Turks."25 
 
Within a few years, however, the Moldovan parliament overwhelming approved a 
Gagauz autonomous territory.  This entity would have three official languages--Gagauz, 
Moldovan, and Russian.  There was no question that the Gagauz were a fully recognized 
group defined primarily by nationality (many Russified Gagauz speak Gagauz poorly).  
As one commentator summarizes, "It is noteworthy that the decision to proceed with 
Gagauz territorial autonomy and the terms of that autonomy have met with a political 
consensus in Moldova; the government has not faced any political or societal backlash . . 
"26   
 
To keep the comparison in mind, in Kosovo a poor and largely rural minority was 
stripped of its autonomy and subject to ethnic cleansing while in Moldova a poor and 
largely rural minority was elevated to territorial autonomy without backlash. The 
differing outcome in these cases was not always apparent during the process of 
breakdown and reconstruction.  In 1990, Gagauz leaders demanded political autonomy 
and set up elections for a new political entity.  In response, tens of thousands of 
Moldovan volunteers converged in the "march to the south" to prevent these elections.  A 
quickly formed alliance of Gagauz, volunteers from Dniestria, and Soviet troops from 
Ukraine who acted as buffers worked to repulse the Moldovan volunteers.  A 
compromise was then reached among relevant elites in which a moratorium was declared 
both for Gagauz elections and Moldavian Supreme Soviet's edict rejecting autonomy for 
Gagauzia.  After this confrontation, attention was again focused on the conflict with 
Dniestria that was described previously.  When the Dniestria situation stabilized, 
Moldovans essentially set upon a policy of appeasement of the Gagauz culminating in the 
agreement granting territorial autonomy and multiple official languages in 1995.27   
                                                 
24Kaufman, p. 160.  Also see Vladimir Socor, "Moldova's Gagauz Republic Organizes and Becomes a 
Precedent for Europe," (www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_001_007_005.htm. 
25Skvortsova, p. 186.   
26Socor, p. 3.   
27I am skipping over some important issues in intra-elite bargaining here for the sake of parsimony. 
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In identity terms, the Gagauz case illustrates a situation in which a poor, marginal group 
confronts a majority group in the midst of state reconstruction and comes away as a new 
and apparently respected territorially based nationality group.  Coming back to Chandra's 
theory, in Moldova attributes were loosened from stable categories and strung together in 
new ways in negotiations among elites.  The new categories become accepted by the 
population and become relatively stable once again.   
 
The case suggests a mechanism for the mitigation of contempt.  Ethnic contempt is based 
on the cognition of a group’s inferiority.  In this case, this cognition became challenged 
by certain political realities.  The Moldovans were confronted with stalemate with the 
Gagauz in October of 1990.  Their "march to the south" was blocked by a combination of 
Gagauz, Dniestrian, and Soviet forces.  How were the Moldovans to interpret being 
blocked by a small and, in many ways inferior, people?  One solution to this situation of 
cognitive dissonance is a reevaluation of the opposing group's worth and status.  In this 
particular case, the outcome was  undoubtedly helped by a relatively low level of ethnic 
contempt (certainly in comparison with Roma, for example) and the interests at stake.  
Moldovans wanted to preserve their gains without risking further conflict.  They also 
wanted to set an example with the Gagauz for possible reconciliation and settlement with 
Dniestria.  Finally, there were few economic goods and little military threat emanating 
from the Gagauz territories.  What small level of contempt that Moldovans felt for the 
Gagauz was likely to be overcome by these interests. 
 
Breakdown and reconstruction can create confrontations transform stigmatized and 
marginal groups into important actors.  If the breakdown of larger states creates many 
smaller states, as in the case of the USSR and Yugoslavia, the process can also create 
demographies that increase percentages of stigmatized groups that make them an 
important focus of electoral politics.  These groups may become either targets of 
exclusion or targets of inclusion.  In either case, the stigmatized group no longer remains 
invisible.  When a stigmatized group becomes politically important, the emotion of 
contempt also becomes salient.  The question becomes whether this emotion can be 
incorporated into constructivist models.  
 
Integrating Contempt into Constructivist Models 
 
A. Individual Trade-offs 
In the case of contempt, individuals do not wish to be included in a category which 
contains significant numbers of stigmatized individuals.  However, there are limits to 
how far individuals allow their emotions to control their behavior.  They might wish to 
exclude those with the stigmatized attribute, but if the political or economic costs of 
exclusion are high, they may act against their natural, emotion-based aversions in order to 
satisfy these interests.   
 
As with anger, the costs involved with contempt can be modeled along a variety of 
indifference curves.  Consider Figure 7.  The vertical axis represents interest measured by 
the percentage difference between two winning coalitions.  The horizontal axis represents 
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the “costs” of contempt measured by the percentage of individuals with the stigmatized 
attribute within the category.  How these indifference lines should be drawn is of course a 
matter of debate.  The modeler would have to incorporate not only insights from social 
psychology, but also anthropological knowledge about the relationships among groups 
within the culture or society under investigation.  Figure 7 simply includes four different 
hypothetical possibilities: 
 
 
Figure 7 Here 
 
 
Line M:  In some cases, individuals may see a straightforward relationship between 
interest and their aversion.  They will accept small numbers of members of the 
stigmatized group (from now on designated by the letter S) even if the pay-off is small, 
but they will accept large numbers of S only if the pay-off is large.  Here, the individual 
accepts the inclusion of 1% S for a 1% decline in MWC.  A 5% inclusion rate would 
require a 5% drop in MWC, a 20% S rate would require a 20% drop, and so on.   
 
Line N:  This linear relationship can be modified to represent more and less severe forms 
of contempt.  Line N shows a function in which every 1% decline in MWC creates 
acceptance of 5% S. 
 
Line O:  In other cases, individuals accept high costs to be in a category completely free 
of S, but once the barrier is broken additional numbers of S create relatively low 
emotional costs.   
 
Line P:  Sometimes individuals might not see a cost for inclusion until the numbers reach 
significant levels.  In effect, “a few are all right,” but too many of them diminish the 
value of the category.  This form of contempt is represented by line P.  Here, emotional 
costs do not kick in until the category includes 20% S.  Then costs increase at the same 
rate as in function M.   
 
The meaning of these indifference curves can be illustrated with reference to the matrices 
in the previous section seen in Table 5 and its three sub-tables.  To recall, the question 
here is the trade-off between moving from the race dimension to the foreign-native 
dimension.  The latter produces better economic and political pay-offs by producing 
lower MWCs.  In the case of anger, the switch comes from the natural erosion of the 
emotion.     
 
The same tables can be used to illustrate the nature of contempt.  Let us assume that 
Blacks and Whites lived together in an autocratic state. That state breaks down and leaves 
Blacks and whites in a democratic political system with large incentives to form winning 
coalitions with just over 50%.  Let us further assume that Blacks have contempt for 
whites and are reluctant to join categories that include whites.  MWC1 is the size of the 
all-Black winning coalition while MWC2 is the number for the foreign-native winning 
coalition.  Thus, in Table 5.1, Blacks in the upper left cell can choose between an all-
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black category with a MWC of .7 or switch to identification on the foreign attribute with 
an MWC of .65 and a percentage S of 38%.  The MWC differential is .05 and the 
percentage S in this category is 38%.  In 5.2, MWC differential is .20 and Percentage S is 
33%.  In 5.3, MWC difference is .38 and percentage S is 13%.   
 
What outcomes can be predicted?  Figure 8 plots the situations represented in the sub-
tables of Table 5 on top of the indifference lines seen in Figure 7.   
 
Figure 8 Here 
 
In two cases, the method predicts an outcome regardless of which of the four functions of 
contempt applies.  For 5.1, the predicted outcome is no movement from all-Black.  For all 
four functions of contempt, the 5 point gain in MWC cannot outweigh the emotional 
costs associated with  38% S.  For the situation illustrated by 5.3, the method here 
predicts movement to the foreign-native dimension for all functions of contempt.  The 
gains created by a 38 point advantage in MWC far outstrip the costs associated with 13% 
S.  The outcome for Figure 5.2 is not so clear.  If contempt works along the lines of 
function N, O, or P then we should expect that the foreign/native dimension becomes the 
basis for politics.  If function M applies, then the prediction is that the black/white 
dimension will remain the primary axis of politics. 
 
B. Elite Calculations 
 
The constructivist approach developed above and in other chapters envisions political 
elites surveying the matrix of salient identities and forming minimum winning coalitions.  
With the existence of a stigmatized attribute, however, calculations become more 
complex. Identity entrepreneurs must not only offer an attractive MWC, but they must 
consider whether individuals driven by contempt will accept a category that includes 
members with the stigmatized attribute.   
 
To illustrate some the strategic constraints and opportunities of elites, consider another 
example with three attributes and many winning coalitions.  
 
 
  Language 
  1 2 3 
A 0.05 0.10 0.15 
B 0.20 0.05 0.05 
R
el
ig
io
n 
C 0.20 0.15 0.05 
 
Table 6 
 
Imagine that in the pre-collapse period, members of religions B and C have an aversion to 
religion A, in effect, they hold members of that religion in contempt.  In the rebuilding 
stage, these groups find themselves in the proportions represented by this matrix.  
Because of the ethnic contempt for religion A, elites of both B and C first bind their 
 26
groups together to form a winning coalition with 70% of the population and 0% S.  Over 
time, however, it becomes clear that new smaller winning categories can be formed by 
combining one religious attribute with a single language-based attribute. In fact, in the 
situation above, both B and C can combine with any single language-based attribute to 
form a winning coalition smaller than B/C. However, all of these new categories will 
contain members of A, the stigmatized group.  Below are the various possibilities 
measured in terms of MWC advantage versus the B/C option and percentage S in the new 
category (B/1 will indicate a category containing all cells with either B or 1 as an 
attribute.  B1 represents the individual cell with B and 1). 
 
B/1: 10, 8.2% 
B/2: 15, 20% 
B/3: 20, 27.3% 
C/1:  5, 7.7% 
C/2:  5, 16.7% 
C/3: 10, 25% 
 
 
These figures can again be plotted.  A/1 and A/2 also form winning coalitions (A/1: 15, 
55%; A/2: 20, 60%).  The status quo (B/C) is represented by the 0, 0 point.   
 
Figure 9 here. 
 
 
If contempt function M applies, then the model makes a unique prediction:  elites will 
move to create category B/1.  Even though the MWC gain is higher in other options, the 
low percentage S drives this option to the left of the indifference curve.  Under function 
M. individuals would continue to prefer B/C over other options.  C elites cannot propose 
a category better than the status quo.  Under function M, the cost of inclusion outweighs 
the benefits of a smaller winning coalition for every choice.  
 
If contempt follows function P, B/1 would not be an acceptable alternative but both B/2 
and B/3 would be improvements from the status quo. B/3 would be the slightly better 
choice among the two.  Again, C elites could not provide a better choice than the status 
quo.28   
    
C. Adding Complexity: The Distribution of Contempt and Stigma Across Cells 
The above analysis assumed that all members of the non-stigmatized population hold the 
same levels of contempt.  In order to contemplate more complex situations, consider the 
matrix below.  
 
 
 
  Language 
                                                 
28 As Line O runs parallel to M, B/1 would be the optimal choice under function O.  Along the same lines, 
B/3 would be the best choice under function N.   
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  1 2 3 
A 0.10S 0.10S 0.10 
B 0.10S 0.05 0.10 
R
el
ig
io
n 
C 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
Table 7 
 
 
The matrix again represents a distribution of attributes along the dimensions of language 
and religion.  In this case, three attributes are represented in the matrix.  The presence of 
a stigmatized attribute is represented in the matrix by the letter S.  In this example, 
suppose that half of the individuals in the cells designated with S possess the stigmatized 
attribute along with the designated attributes of language and religion.  Thus, in cell A1 
10% of the population speaks language 1 as their primary language and identifies with 
the religion A.  Half of the individuals in this cell, or 5% of the total population, also 
possess the stigmatized attribute S.   In this example, 15% of the population possesses the 
stigmatized attribute but these numbers are found only in three cells: A1, A2, B1.  No 
significant numbers of those with the stigmatized attribute speak language 3 or practice 
religion C.  On the other hand, 33% of those practicing religion A also possess the quality 
S.   
 
How might we expect levels of contempt to vary across such a matrix?  Extensive work 
on the contact hypothesis shows that interaction among groups can reduce levels of 
prejudice and stigma. 29  Without reviewing this voluminous literature, a few common 
sense assumptions might be made.  For instance, those who already share attributes with 
stigmatized individuals might be likely to experience lower levels of ethnic contempt.   
As mentioned, in the example above 33% of those with religion A possess the 
stigmatized attribute.  The emotion of contempt depends on the cognition that those with 
the stigmatized attribute are somehow inferior.  But how inferior can a group be if they 
are worshipping the same God in the same way in the same country?30  Would the 67% 
of A religionists without the stigma feel the same level of ethnic contempt as members of 
religion B (20% S) and especially religion C (0% S)?   
 
In surveying the matrix in Table 5, the following are the percentages of S for each 
attribute.   A: 33%, B: 20%, C: 0%, 1: 33%, 2: 17%, 3: 0%.  These figures might provide 
a rough guide to the distribution of ethnic contempt.  If we form a rough estimate of high, 
medium, and low sharing of attributes, then a member of cell A1 would score high on 
interaction on both language and religious dimensions.  Consequently, the level of 
contempt for non-S members of A1 could be assumed to be low.    In contrast, members 
of C/3 never interact with stigmatized individuals in religion and speak a language that no 
As speak.  Cell C3 would be zero on both dimensions and could be assumed to have very 
                                                 
29 See H.D Forbes, Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997), for one of the most complete discussions of work on the contact hypothesis. 
30 It’s not hard to come up with examples that go against this point, Blacks in the US South for example, 
but I am making a general point here. 
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high levels of ethnic contempt.  Following a simple scale, this logic leads to the following 
distribution of contempt across the matrix:31 
 
 
  Language 
  1 2 3 
A   Very Low Low Medium 
B Low Medium High 
R
el
ig
io
n 
C Medium High    Very High
  
Table 8: Relative Levels of Ethnic Contempt 
 
For graphical simplicity, assume that these values are connected to the trade-offs between 
emotion and interest in the following manner: 
 
Figure 10 Here 
 
In this figure, three lines draw different ratios between percentage increase in MWC and 
percentage increase in S.  The line farthest left shows a function in which every one 
percentage increase in S is matched to a three percentage increase in the MWC value.  
The middle line is the same as function M in the previous diagram, indicating a 1:1 ratio.  
The farthest line is drawn according to 3:1 ratio.  The areas in between these lines 
correspond the designations in Table 8.  Individuals with very high levels of contempt 
will only move off a status quo if the new category presents a situation represented in the 
area to the left of line E.  Those with high levels of contempt will move to any point to 
the left of F, and so on. 
 
Now we can return to the calculations of identity entrepreneurs.  In their calculus, they 
must consider four factors: 1) MWC 2) %S 3) the distribution of contempt 4) the play of 
opposing identity entrepreneurs.  Along lines of the process previously outlined, identity 
entrepreneurs emerge and combine attributes into new categories in their effort to create 
new minimum winning coalitions.  Assume that in the example above identity 
entrepreneurs first emerge from religious groups.  Given this particular distribution, there 
are a multitude of possible winning coalitions.   
 
In the hypothetical matrix above, political entrepreneurs from religious group C are likely 
to put forth a strategy based on excluding all S.  C elites could choose the strategy that 
promises the smallest winning group, C/2.  It seems just as likely though, given their 
homogeneity, that they would choose C/3. This choice would represent the only possible 
winning strategy that would completely exclude S.   
 
                                                 
31 Level of contempt can be connected to the average S on both dimensions combined.  In this example, let 
us say that an average S on both dimensions of above 20% produces a low level of contempt, an 11%-19% 
rate produces a medium level, a 2-10% is associated with a high level, and very high of contempt is found 
with levels of S below 2%. 
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Assuming that C/3 is established as the status quo, how might entrepreneurs from 
opposing religious groups respond?  The situation is illustrated in Figure 10.  C/3 is 
represented by the 0, 0 point in Figure 10, competing categories are also indicated.  As 
opposed to the previous analysis, the situation becomes more complicated when the 
distribution of contempt comes into play.  Identity entrepreneurs must consider the nature 
of each cell.  To see why this is the case, consider the options of B elites.  If they play B/2 
against C/3, two cells—B3 and C2 come under direct competition.  B elites are in effect 
offering the individuals in these two cells a package of  MWC and S vs. the status quo. In 
effect, B elites offer individuals in these cells an improvement of 15 points in MWC but a 
cost of the inclusion of 20% S.  On the surface this deal would seem attractive.  However, 
both of these cells rank high in contempt.  Looking at Figure 10, category B/2 lies below 
the F line and is not an acceptable option. 
 
Likewise, option B/3 would fail to displace C/3.  In this match-up, the cells under 
competition would include A3, B3, and C3.  Here, cell C3 would in effect act as a veto 
player.  Given its very high level of contempt—it is the only cell with no connection 
whatsoever with stigmatized individuals—members of C3 will reject any alternative to 
the right of the E line.  Without the inclusion of cell C3, the category would fail to 
generate a majority.    
 
In this scenario, identity entrepreneurs from religious group A actually have a better 
choices than B elites. The category A/1 again puts two cells in direct competition with the 
category C/3—A3 and C1.  Critically, both of these cells hold medium contempt and 
neither will defect from category A/1 as it represents a position above the G line.  Despite 
the fact that the category A/1 contains all of the society’s stigmatized individuals, the 
choice remains an attractive option in comparison to the “pure” choice of C/3.  In effect, 
this category embodies a coalition of the most tolerant.  These members of society are 
willing to be grouped in a category that contains 30% S in order to obtain the benefits 
offered by a smaller winning coalition.  A/2 seems to be an attractive option, but again 
the C2 cell lies below the trade-off line.  For A/B, the problem lies with the high 
contempt level of cell B3. 
 
Conclusions 
The breakdown and reconstruction of multiethnic states is an important topic in its own 
right.  For the purposes of this volume though, the key aspect of these processes is that 
they usually generate strong emotions.  The often violent nature of state-breakdown 
produces victims and strong emotions of anger.  The reconstruction of states often 
recombines ethnic groups into new demographies.  Reconstruction also can create smaller 
states.  In these smaller states, stigmatized groups sometimes become a larger percentage 
of the population.  These groups can no longer be marginalized with the result that 
citizens of the new state must confront their own emotions of ethnic contempt.   
 
Political science models assume that individuals and leaders pursue interests, but also that 
they pursue interests under constraints.  This chapter has sought to analyze one particular 
type of constraint on action—emotions.  Although largely ignored by political science, 
emotions can be powerful constraints on action.  Under the sway of anger, an anger 
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perhaps caused by killings and humiliations, individuals cannot freely pursue every 
option.  Long-standing and culturally embedded ethnic contempt prevents individuals 
from considering choices based on political and economic benefits alone.   
 
Yet, while emotions constrain and proscribe choice, they do not eliminate choices.  
Emotions often have a dynamic quality.  Anger recedes over time.  Contempt cannot be 
maintained in the face of new political realities that challenge the cognitions that the 
emotion is founded on.  Violence may create emotions that “freeze” identities, but the 
relentless influence of interest may serve to eventually thaw these identities.  We know 
that ethnic contempt and prejudice can fade in new circumstances.  The problem is that 
we don’t have a good grasp of how emotion and interest interact.  Political scientists 
analyze interests, but they only hope that emotions do not interfere too much with the 
logic of their models.   
 
This chapter has tried to create simple models that combine emotion and interest.  These 
models generate predictions and might serve as the basis of more sophisticated 
hypotheses.  In order to be really useful, much more work would need to be done.  A 
truly interdisciplinary effort synthesizing social psychology, anthropology, and political 
science is required.   In the end, the promise of these models can only be realized through 
extensive empirical work.   
 
Such hard work, however, promises significant rewards.  In this chapter, I have used 
cases from the Balkans.  We cannot understand and guide the political processes 
occurring between Slavs and Albanians in the region without consideration of emotion.  
We certainly cannot understand the politics involved with the Roma in Eastern Europe 
without incorporating ethnic contempt.  Beyond this region, it is doubtful that the 
political processes currently unfolding in the Middle East can be fully understood without 
including emotion in our study.  At the time of this writing, Iraq is being reconstructed.  
Violence has produced anger; occupation has produced resentment; new institutions 
attempt to create respect among the state’s constituent ethnic groups.  In this situation, 
and future situations, we cannot simply hope that emotions will not interfere too much in 
the bargaining, constitution-building, and institution creation of the rebuilding process.  
We need to understand the influence of this integral aspect of human nature.   
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APPENDIX  
 
 
 
Figures 1 and 2 (to be relabeled) 
 
 
 33
 
Figures 3 and 4 (to be relabeled) 
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Figures 5 and 6 (to be relabeled) 
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